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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CO\!1ES NOW the Appellant Gary Alexander Hern, by and through his attorney of record.
CI IARLFS .'Vi. STROSCIIEIN of the Im\ firm of Clark and Feeney. and pursuant to the Court of

Appeals· Order. dated September 2 L 2015. supplements the Appellant's brief.
On April 5, 2013, Mr. IIcrn was stopped for DUI. Ilis Administrative License Suspension
I !earing was held May 9, 2013. Starer. BesmL 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3cl 219 (Ct. App.2013) was
issued by the Court of Appeals on June 2L 2013. On July 3, 2014. Judge Stegner issued his ruling
in State v. Ncwerr, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176. On August 20, 2015, the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in State v. Haynes. No. 41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664 from a February
23. 2013 DUI stop. On August 24, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in State v.

Riendeau. Docket No. 41982-2014. Opinion No. 8 from a \;larch 21. 2013. DUI stop. State v.
Bescm, State v. Xauert. State v. Haynes, and State v. Riendeau. arc all cases that developed the issue
of the Standard Operating Procedures (hereinafter referred to as: '·S()Ps") and rule-making after Mr.
Hern· s J\LS hearing. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the 2013 SOPs were mid for
lack of rule-making.
The District Court in Hern did not hmc the benefit of the Haynes or Riendeau decisions vvith
regard to its analysis of J.C. §67-5279(3) issues and the use by the ALS hearing officer of the 2013
SOPs as a basis for license a suspension.
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IV.
ARGUMENT
THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR BREATH TESTING IS VOID, THEREFORE MR. HERN'S BREATH
TEST IS INV ALU) FOR THE PURPOSE OF LICENSE SUSPENSION.
In Bobeck v. Idaho Transportation Department. Docket No. 42682, 2015 Opinion No. 5, the
Court of Appeals noted:

This Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed
the agency's statutory authority: (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary. capricious. or an
abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision
must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3)
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. (Cites omitted)
Opinion. pp.3-4
The Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter referred to as: 'TrD") violated the
pn)\isions ofl.C. §67-5279(3) by sustaining Mr. I Iern's license suspension based on the SOPS that
\\ere in effect at the time of Mr. Hern·s DUI stop in 2013. There v;erc no adequate administrative
rules regarding breath testing pursuant to l.C. § I 8-8004( 4) and I.C. § 18-8002/\(3) in effect in 2013,
as a result. ITD's statutory authority to suspend licenses was exceeded.
The findings, inferences, conclusions and decisions of the Hern hearing officer were made
upon an unlawful procedure in that ITD used void SOPs as a basis to make the finding that the breath
test \Vas done pursuant to Idaho Code.

r\PPELl.A'sT"S S\:PPIJ.\lE0iTAL BRIEF
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Finaily. the ALS decision is arbitrary, capricious. and an abuse of discretion because the ALS
hearing officers were required to use valid rules for breath testing \\hilc ISPFS \Vas required to
produce valid rules for breath testing.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Staie v. Riendeau, No. 41982-2014. Opinion No. 81, notes: in
Stole v. I Jaynes. :-Jo.41924-2014, 2015 WI, 4940664 (Idaho Aug. 20, 2015 ), this Court held that the
2013 SOPs \Vere void because they were not adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
Opinion, p. 5.
IIern is not a case in which an expert testified that the breath testing was accurate. The
hearing officer relied on the SOPs. R. at pp. 21, 29 1• The SOPs were challenged on appeal as a
basis for supporting the breath test pursuant to I.C. §67-5279(3). Please also note the emails from
ISPFS. Augmented Record at pp. 264-424. One would have to wonder exactly what expert would
be called in the State ofidaho to save breath-testing. Is the Court going to rely on Jeremy Johnston
as an expert considering his statements in the emails?
The decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court in Riendeau and llaynes follow Mr. Hem's
argument regarding the SOPs and the lack of rule-making. Mr. Hem's case is a 2013 Administrative
License Suspension. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 2013 SOPs are void.

1

'·8. Hem's evidentiary test was conducted in accordance with the requirements of LC. § 18-8004, IDAPA
Rules, and ISP's Standard Operating Procedure.'' R, p. 21
·• J. Tpr. Schoonmaker followed all procedures and satisfied all requirements pursuant to LC. §§ I 88002A and 18-8004, and the ISP's Standard Operating Procedure was properly adhered to." R, p. 29
APPEi .LANT"S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
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Under Idaho Law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw, an agency action charac!erized
as a rule must he promulgated according to statutory directives for rule-making. See I.C. ~67-5231
( declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements oflAPA).
Therefore. in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rule-making procedures, this
Court must decide that the SOPs arc void and thus, do not have the full force and effect oflaw. If
the SOP for breath-testing docs not have the full force and effect of law it cannot be the basis for
ITD's action to suspend driving privileges. Any agency actions resting on the 2013 SOP for breath
alcohol testing must be set aside.
Please recollect that Mr. Hem has a valuable property right in his driver's license. In Bell

v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court stated:
··Once licenses arc issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses ... involves State actions that
adjudicates important interest of the licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken av,ay without that procedural due process required by the Fourth Amendment."
At p. 539.
The Idaho Supreme Court did not have the benefit of the emails that arc part of this record.
The emails show the frivolous nature of ISPFS's attempt at tlwvarting valid challenges to breath
testing. Sec SOPs changes from January 7, 2015; January 8, 2015; and February 13, 2015.

The

SOPs have been dumbed-down and continue to be dumbed-down for no scientific purpose. The only
purpose for the changes to the SOP is to convict people of DUls and have their licenses suspended
in Administrative License Suspension matters.
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ISP Forensic Services and the ITD have been on notice for a number of years that the SOPs
were suspect but neither State agency took any action to f<)IIO\v rule-making until Judge Stegner
issued his ground-breaking decision in State v. Nauer!. Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176,
Supreme Court Docket No. 0042441-2014. Finally. a District Judge said enough was enough. The
stay of the appeal in Nauer! has been lifted and the briefing schedule has been reset.
The Idaho Supreme Court made the determination that the SOPs arc void. As a result, Mr.
Hem's license suspension must be vacated. It is clear the hearing officer issued his decision based
on the SOPs and not expert testimony. Mr. Hem has met his burden of proof, pursuant to J.C. §675279(3).
One wonders v.;hy the State doesn't concede the point by simply doing v,;hat the State did in

Stme ,•. Victor Smith, 127 Idaho 77,813 P.2d 888 (1991). The State, at the time ofS'mith. conceded
that the fllegal Drug Stamp Tax Act \Vas unconstitutional and informed Counsel of that decision
prior to oral argument. The State then acknowledge the statute was unconstitutional at the time of
oral argument. The State in its Supplemental Briefing should concede that Mr. Hem's license
suspension should be vacated.
The State in its Supplemental Brief may argue that the hearing officer's decision in 2013
should not be effected by the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015. However, this position
would be contrary to prior holdings of appellate courts. The Court can look at Gay r. County

Commissicmers o/Bonneville County, l 03 Idaho 626. 651 P.2d 560 (Idaho App. 1982) in which the
Coun of Appeals discussed the issue of standard ofreview. A copy of the case is attached as Exhibit
5

A for the Court's case ofrefrrence. The Court noted that the District Court followed \\hat had been

a well-established line offdaho decisions but that the \\ell-established line of decisions \\as changed
during the pend ency of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme in its decision in C·ooper r. Board ofCounty

( 'omm 'rs o/Ada ( ·ounty. 10 l Idaho 407. 614 P.2d 94 7 ( 1980). The Court in Gay noted that C'ooper
has fundamentally altered our perspective on the proper standard ofjudicial review. The Court then
analyzed ho\\ this change should be applied to other cases. The Gay Court noted: '·There are no
constitutional limitations upon a court's choice to give either retroactive or prospective effect to a
decision altering a prior rule of la\v. Unklelfer v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731.14, L.Ed.2d

601 (]965)'". Gay, 103 Idaho at 630. 651 P.2d 564. The Court went on to note that the '·pipeline
approach·' was the appropriate approach in applying a new rule on similar cases pending when the
new rule was announced.
The Court can look at the language from the Cooper decision:

.. It is clear there is a pressing need in Idaho for established standards and procedures
by which particularized land use regulation is to be administered. To allow the
discretion of local zoning bodies to remain \·irtually unlimited in the determination
of individual rights is to condone government by men rather than government by
law:·

Cooper. 101 Idaho at 411, 614 P.2d at 951
The above quote is extremely relevant to issue of ISP Forensic Services and the \Vay it has
handled breath testing for alcohol in the State ofldaho. It has been Jeremy Johnston and his cohorts
at ISP using .. weasel words" rather than government by law in breath testing. The Court, in this ease,
has the choice to send a clear message that government by law is important. Since the Hern matter
APPL! .I;\'.\ r·s Sl.'PPI E\!E'.\T;\L BRIEF
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was in the ·'pipeline ... the decisions from the Idaho SuprL"me Court in llaynes and Riendeau, should
be applied to vacate Mr. I Iern · s license suspension. The 2013 SOPs were void, therefore there \Vere
no rules for breath-testing. Mr. Hem's 2013 breath test was imalid.

V.
CONCLUSION
The Court must find that the license suspension \Vas improper and enter an order directing
ITD to n1cate the license suspension for Mr. Hern.
DATED this~ day of October, 2015.
CLARK and FEENEY. LLP

Attorneys for Appellant
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] hereby ccrti fy on the 9th
day of October. 2015. a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
\\as: XX
).failed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:
Edv,in L. Littcnckcr
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston. ID 83501

CI .ARK and FEENEY. LLP
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Page 626

\,-ere presumptively

l03 Idaho 626 (Idaho App. 1982)

Page 628

651 P.2d 560

1651 P.2d 5621 valid. and that the scope ofjudicial r\:\-icw
limits:d to looking fi_,r capriciousness. arbitrariness or

John GAY and Janice Gay, his wife, Plaintiffs
Appellants,

and

discrin1ination. Sec, e.g., DaHson [)1re1prises, Inc.

i' Blainr.:
Countr, 98 Idaho 506. 567 P.2d 1257 (1977):
Rcadi -lo-Pour, Inc. 1 J!cCov, 95 Idaho 510, 511 P_2d 792

( 1973 ). However. during the pendency of this appeal. our

COlJ:\TY CO:\L\IISSIO:\ERS OF BO:\:\E\'ILLE
COU:'1/TY, aud Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc., Defendants
and Respondents.

Supreme Court issued its decision in Cooper

L Board of
Countr Comm'rs ofAda Counti, IOI Idaho 407,614 J>.2d
947 ( l 9?10). Cooper has fundamentally altered our

perspective on the proper standard of judicial re\iew

:"io. 13647.

Cooper draws a distinction between determination of
general zoning policies and the application of such policies

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

to specific situations_ The former function is deemed
legislative. and the latter quasi-judicial_ The Cooper opinion

September 21, 1982

treats the restricted standard ofjudicial review. employed
Petition for Review Denied Nov. 15. l 982_

by the district court and illustrated by Dawson and
Ready-to-Pour. as a form of judicial deference to legislative

[651 P.2d 56IJ

action. This restrained standard of review is appropriate to

Page 627

comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning

such

John :VI. Ohman, Cox. Ohman & Wcinpcl, Idaho Falls, for
plaintiffa and appellants.

determinations

ordinances_ In contrast,

as

the

adoption

of

a decision whether to rezone a

particular parcel of property is regarded by Cooper as
quasi-judicial, subject to due process protections_ Sec also,

John [)_ Hansen and Michael R. Orme of Hansen.
Boyle. Beard & :Vlartin.

legislative

Idaho Falls. fix de fondant

and

respondent, Simplot Soilbuilders, Inc.

e.g., Fasano L Board ofC01111t1 Comm'rs of /Vashingron
Coun(\'. 264 Or. 574. 507 P.2d 23 (1973). O\em1kd on
other grounds, Xcuhcrgcr

Ciry of Pordand. 288 Or. 585,

i

607 P 2d 722 ( 1980).

BURNETT. Judge.

Although

The issue presented is whether procedural due process

the

county's

action

here

characterized as the granting of a !lvariancc,

has
11

been

it \\'as in

was afforded in proceedings before zoning authorities, on a

reality a change of authorized

request to change the authorized use of a particular parcel

parcel of property. The concept of a variance is narrowly

of land. Simplot Soilbuilders,

treated by LC.~ 67-6516. par1 of the Local Planning Act of

Inc., sought and obtained

land use for a particular

from Bonnc\-ille County a variance to construct a fertilizer

1975. which had been enacted before Simplot filed its

storage and blending facility in an area zoned A-!

application with the county, The statute defines a variance

agricultural. The owners of adjoining property, John and

as follows:

Janice Gay, brought this action to vacate the variance. Thev
alleged that numerous procedural errors had infected th~
\·ariance granting process, and that certain findings made by
the zoning authorities

were unsupported

by a sketchy

record, The district court upheld the variance and dismissed
the Gays' complaint. We reverse.

a

modification

of the

requirements

ordinance as to lot size, lot

CO\

of the

[zoning]

erage, width, d-:pth, front

yard, side yard. rear yard. setbacks, parking space, height of
buildings. or other ordinance provision affecting the size or
shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon
lots, or the size oflots.
A variance, as so defined, does not inc Jude a change of

The threshold question

is whether

the district court

authorized land use. Rather, it is limited to adjustment of

applied the comtct standard of judicial re\-iew The district

certain regulations concerning the physical characteristics

court--following what had been a well-established line of

of the subject property.

Idaho decisions--held that all actions of zoning authorities

APPENDIX 1

It is not disputed in this
that a fertilizer storage and
blending facility foll outside the scope of permitted land
in an A-I agricultural

The "rnriancc" procured

by Simplot made permissible a land use previously not
authorized by the 7oning ordinance. We cannot ,·kw a
request for such a '\·ariancc" differently from the request

for raoning addressed in Cooper. We h,ild that the Cooper

P.2d at 95 l.
In the present case. Bonneville County and Simplot
hm·c argued thm the failures identified in Cooper merely
illustrate factors rckrnnt to a due procc,s determination.
and that none of them represent, a deprivation of due
However, specific findmgs and notice of
process per

requirement of procedural

mct:tings--frorn which m: infer the right to a reasonable

for a particular parcel of property, regardless of whether the

opportunity to present and to rebut cvidcnce--havc been
recognized as fundamental clements of procedural due

due process i, appl1cahk to
proceeding;,; on a requ(.'.st h) change the land use authori?t.:d
subject of such proceedings carric, the labd '\·ariancc" or
1

'rc7oning."

process in a Yariety of contexts. See, e.g .. Goss i· Lope::.
419 U.S. 565, 95 SCt. 7'29, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975): 1/o!jfi.
:\fcDomdl, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 LEd.2d 935

The right to procedural

due procc,s i, sccur.;d by

( 1974). :Vlorcover, we view a transcribablc

record

as

Article L Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution and by the

indispensable to rneaningfol judicial reYiew of rezoning

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
That adjoining land owners, who arc "affrctcd persons''

proceedings wher..: the sufficiency of notice, adequacy of
opportunity to present or to rebut e\·idencc, or the existence

under I.C. ( 67-6521, h:ne property interest;; entitled to due
process protection ha, not been contested in this case.

of cYidencc supporting the agency's findings may be put at
issue. [ I J Under Idaho law,
rezoning decision might he

!knee, wc presume such interests to exist "and the question

reviewed on any of these points. l.C. §~ 67-652l(d),
67-521 S(g).

then is what process is due." /'an Ord.::n
663.665,637P.2d 1159, 1161 (!9g!).

i·.

State:, 102 Idaho

\\'e belicYe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper,
The United States Supreme Court has imparkd
elastic quality to the concept of procedural due process,

an

'[D]uc process' .. is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances ..
[l]dentification of the specific dictaks of due process
generally rc,1uircs consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action: seccmd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures

used, and the probati\'e

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally,

together with the opportunity to present and to rebut
evidence, meet the standards for due process requirements
under Mathews v. Eldridge, infra. First, each requirement is
germane to the property interests of parties seeking, or
alh·crsely affected by, a change of zoning. Secondly, the
requirements afford minimum safrguards against erroneous
deprivation of such interests. Finally, none of the
requirements appears to be unduly burdensome. Even the
requirement of a tran,cribablc record--which has excited
some controversy in this appeal--compcls zoning authorities
to do no more than conduct the public's business "on the
record," preserve documents receh·ed and produced, and
operate a tape recorder during hearings or meetings wht:n

Page 629
165! P.2d 563] the Gowmment's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute requirements would entail.
:lfathms \. E!drh(r;e, 424 U.S, 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct.
893, 902-03, 47 LEd.2d 18 (1976): accord, Van Orden v.

State, supra. The full dimensions of procedural due process,
as contemplated by the Cooper decision, have yet to be
developed. However, on the facts presented in Cooper, our
Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process
resulted from (a) failure to give notice ofa second meeting
of zoning authorities

information on a requested 7oning change is received or
official action is taken. Accordingly, we hold that notice,
opportunity to present and to rebut evidence, preparation of
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core
of procedural due process requirements, constitutionally
mandated

in

all

cases

where zoning

authorities

are

requested to change the land use authorized for a particular
parcel of property.

I!
We tum now to the questions of whether, and how.

(after a public hearing), when a

these due process requirements should be applied to the

rezoning request was considered and staff views were
expressed: (b) failure to keep a transcribable verbatim

instant case. As noted previously, Cooper was decided
while this appeal was pending. Bonneville County and

record of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and

Simplot, in a well-crafted brief and argument, urge that
requirements based
on
Cooper not
be applied
"retroactively" here,

(c) failure to make specific written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the
rezoning request was based. Cooper, IOI Idaho at 411, 614

There
no constiturional limirations upon a court's
choice to give either
or prospcctin: effect to
decision altering a prior rnlc of law. Unklcttcr
381 C.S. 618. 85 S.Ct. 1731. 14

1

Walker.

expect that the decision of the county zoning authorities
ultimately would be upheld under the pre-Cooper standard
of judicial re,icw
Reliance upon an existing rule of law is one of the

Page 630
[651 P.2d 5641 LEd2d 601 (1965): Grc'al \'or/hem
Railm1y Co. 1·. S1111h11rsl Oil & Refining Co, 287 U.S 358.
53 SCt. 145. 77 LEJ. 360 ( l 932) The choice is
discretionary. The range of mailable choices includes
applying a new rule of law to all cases ("retroacti\ity" ):
applying the rule only to future cases ("prospcctivity"J:
applying the rule to future cases and to the case decided (a
form of"rnodificd prospectivity"); or applying the rule to
future cases. to the case dccickd. and to similar cases
pending on appeal when the new rule was announced (a
broader form of "modified prospectiYity"J See, e.g ..
7lzompson 1·. !fagan. 96 Idaho I 9, 5:?3 P.2d l 365 ( l 974);
Dm,son \ Olson, 94 Idaho 636. 496 P.2d 97 ( 1972 ). For
case ofrcference. we will call the broader form of modified
prospectivity the "pipe]in,2 approach," because it includes
similar cases in the appellate system "pipeline" when the
new rule of law was announced.

criteria to be considered in choosing among the Yari ous
rctroacti\·ity and prospccti\·ity alternatives. It must be
weighed against two other criteria--thc purpose of the new
rule of law announced. and the effect of retroacti\ity or
prospecti\ity upon the administration of justice. Sec, e.g ..

Jones l'. Watson, 9X Idaho 606, 570 P.2d n4 (1977):
Rogers\. Ycllmr.,·rone Park Co. 97 Idaho 14. 25. 539 P.2d
566,577 (1974) (on rehearing): Thompson\. Hagan. supra.
Ordinarily. these criteria arc considered in the ckcision
announcing a new rule of law. [lowc\·cr. because no such
analysis has yet been articulated in connection with Cooper.
and because the instant case is asserted to be dissimilar, ·we
will analyze the criteria here.
The reliance claimed by Simplot is not upon the
pre-Cooper rule itself. but upon an expectation that
applying the pre-Cooper standard necessarily would ha\·c
resulted in upholding the county's zoning decision. \\'c need
not indulge in an "opinion within an opinion." actually
applying the pre-Cooper standard. It is sufficient to note
that judicial review in this case was sought to determine

In Cooper our Supreme Coun did not explicitly pass on
the retroactivity question. However, the court applied its
holding on procedural due process to the facts of that case.
Similarly. in Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Blaine County, 101

whether the proper zoning ordinance had been used by the
county authorities: \\·hether findings of fact, which were
entered specifically in response to this litigation and which

Idaho 420. 614 P.2d 960 ( l 980)--a n:zoning case pending
when Cooper was decided--the Supreme Court reversed a

consisted partly of a recitation of language from the zoning
ordinance, were valid: and whether the findings of fact were

dekrmination by zoning authorities. and remanded the case
with an instruction to the district court that the zoning
authorities be directed to comply with Cooper Thus, it

adequately suppot1ed by a record

plainly appears that the Supreme Court has not explicitly
rejected rctroactivity, and has, at least. adopted the
"pipeline approach"--applying Cooper to the case decided
and to similar cases pending when the rule of Cooper was
announced, as well as to future cases. We need not address
the possibility of "retroactivity" in this case. The "pipeline

Page 631
[651 P,2d 5651 which consisted partially of disputed
recollections by zoning officials of the proceedings before
them. We cannot say that the final disposition of such
issues, on appeal. would have been free from doubt under

approach" is sufficieut to determine the impact of Cooper
upon this appeal.

the pre-Cooper standard. Moreover. when the district judge
was informed that Simplot had staned construction while a
petition for judicial review was pending. he pointedly stated

Simplot and Bonneville County contend that this case

on the record, that "you are building at your peril. as it
were." Simplot's counsel acknowledged that "[t]here are

1s outside the "pipeline" because it is not a "similar"
pending case. They point to the fact that Cooper and
Walker-Schmidt were appeals from judgments upholding
denials of rezoning requests. ln contrast. this appeal has

certain risks from this point on, [ suppose." The weight that
might otherwise have been ascribed to the reliance criterion

been taken from a judgment upholding the grant of a change
in authorized land use. The significance of this distinction,
we are told. is that during the course of this litigation

Against this diminished claim of reliance we must
weigh the effect of the "pipeline approach" upon the

Simplot actually constructed the facility for which the
change in authorized land use had been sought. Simplot
does not contend that the appeal has been rendered moot.
However, we are now asked to exempt this case from due
process scrutiny on the ground that Simplot had a right to

is diminished in this case.

purpose of the Cooper decision, and upon the
administration of justice. The following language from the
Cooper opinion is relc,ant to both of these criteria:

It is clear that there is a pressing need in Idaho for
established
standards
and
procedures
by
which

APPENDIX 1

particularized land use regulation
to be administered, To
allow the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain
\'irrually unlimited in
detennination of indr,idual rights
is to condone grFcrnmerlt by men rather than government

conducted proceedings in confonniry with
requirements
ha,,c drawn from Cooper Therefore:. the judgment of
the di:arict court reversed, and the
direction that the district court require

is remanded \Vith

by law, [IO l Idaho at 4 J l. 614 P 2d at 951,]
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\\' c belie Ye this clear expression of purpose would be
thwarted if
rcfoscd to apply the requirements of
procedural due process to this
It appears that the
county zoning authorities made no specific findings to
support their ckcision until faced with a lawsuit testing the
\alidity of the rkcision, It further appears that the findings
were ba,ed largely upon one zoning board member's
familiarity with the property in question, The county kept

no transcribablc record from which a re\'icwing court could

[651 P.2d 566] Bonnc,i!Ic County to reconsider Sirnplot's
request in confonnity with this opinion,
\\ALTERS, C, Land SWANSTRO:\I, J. concur,

Notes:

determine the extent to which the infomiation known to this

[I] Since the filing of thi, appeal. the Idaho Legislature has

board member was presented at a public meeting of which
notice had been gi\'en. or the extent to which the interested
parties were afforded an opportunity to rebut such c\idcnce

imposed a statutory requirement of a transcribabk record
upon all land use proceedings where judicial review is
arnilablc, See LC ~ 67-6536 (added in 1982),

We also believe that the proper administration of
justice will best be scr\'cd by applying due process
requirements here, Due to the lack of an adequate record of
what had transpired at the county le\'el, the district judge
was forced to take conflicting evidence, and to make
findings. on how the zoning proceedings were conducted
and on what basis the county reached its decision, The court
then was required to rc\'icw the propriety of the county's
decision upon a record which the court itself had
participated in creating. Dc\·cloping the record of
proceedings before an administrative agency, from
conflicting evidence. falls outside the purposes for which a
reviewing court should take e,·idcnce under applicable
portions of JC, ~ 67-5215. CJ llill 1 Board of'Co1111!1'
Comm'rs, 101 [daho 850,623 P,2d 462 (1981) (holding trial
de novo inappropriate upon petition for judicial reYiew of
denial of a rezoning application), :\fore fundamentally, we
Yiew this process as a distortion of the judicial review
fonction,
Weighing all of the criteria--rc!iance on the prior rule
of law, the purpose of the new rule, and the effect upon the
administration of justicc--wc conclude that the "pipeline
approach" to Cooper is appropriate and that it embraces this
case, We hold that the procedural due process requirements
we ha\'c drawn from Cooper govern disposition of this
appeal, Because no transcribablc record was kept and
because, without such a record, a reviewing court in this
case could not determine that the interested parties received
notice of all meetings at which information concerning rhe
zoning request was recei\'ed. or that an opportunity to rebut
such information was afforded, we conclude that the
county's decision must be set aside.
The other issues raised by the petition for judicial
review likely would be mooted, or resolved, if the county

